Divine Command Theory
This could potentially be one of the more controversial subjects we discuss in ethical theory. Many people have very strong feelings regarding religion and also very strong views on the connection between religion and morality. It will be useful for us to remember what I said earlier that my job here is not to tell you what to think but to share with you some theories and different approaches to ethics. Also I should point out that our conversation on this subject will be only the tip of the iceberg so to speak. We cannot address all the areas this conversation entails which would include theology, textual analysis of the Bible, the history of various religions. While these are very interesting and worthwhile subjects there's only so much we can cover here in an ethics course. In that context what we are trying to address is the question of what would be an adequate foundation for morality. There are problems with making religion the foundation.
We can divide this subject into two parts and actually ask two questions. Is religion the basis or foundation for morality? Is God the basis or foundation for morality? It is really the second question which provides the basis for the strongest attempt to provide this foundation but first let's consider the possibility of religion being the foundation for morality.
I hope everyone is clear on the distinction I mean to make here between religion and God. As a way of illustrating this we can think of religion as a man made institution with many different variations, while God is independent of these religions and a transcendent being. While God may be the ultimate origin of one religion or all religions, it is very different to base morality on any one of these religions than to base it on God directly.
It is precisely the variations in religions that create the problem for basing morality on religion. Simply put, How do we know which religion is the right one to serve as the foundation? Of course everyone would say their own is the correct one but can we provide any objective evidence for this? It seems difficult to establish such objective criteria. Even if we could we still have a problem of variation because each religion has many different denominations. To illustrate this one has only to look to the United States and the classic in the field Frank S. Mead's Handbook of Denominations in the United States. This is a 350+ page book outlining all the denominations (and there are many) currently practiced. Even within major Christian denominations such as Baptist, Lutheran, and Methodist, there are many variations. If we're looking for a single foundation here we're in for some difficulties.
A third problem which we can only briefly touch on here is the problem Rachels alludes to with using Scripture as a basis for moral judgments. The difficulty here is how to be sure we're interpreting the works properly. Of course this presupposes we've addressed the question about which holy book is the correct one to use in the first place. Assuming we have, there is still the problem of interpretation since each of the Scriptures we might use could be interpreted many different ways.
This is why many philosophers look to a more abstract solution and attempt to base morality on God. There are two attempts to do this which Rachels outlines: the divine command theory and the theory of natural law. Let's consider each of these in turn.
The divine command theory postulates that morality is based directly on the commands of God himself. What God commands us to do is morally right and what God forbids us to do is morally wrong. The basis of morality then is the command itself. But, this raises an interesting question and the major problem with the divine command theory. Why is God issuing just these commands? Does God command us to do a certain action because it is moral or is it moral because God commands it? These seem to be the only two alternatives but each involves a serious problem and together a genuine dilemma for morality. Let's see why:
God commands us to do a certain action because it is moral. If this is true then God is not the ultimate origin of morality. God simply is communicating to us what is and what is not moral without being the originator. In other words, there is a reason different from God's actions themselves that makes something moral or immoral.
An action is moral because God commands it. If this option is true then morality becomes arbitrary. If the only reason that murder is immoral is because God said so, couldn't God say something different and then that would be immoral? Or couldn't God declare murder to be moral and then it would be moral?
This dilemma has led many religious thinkers to seek an alternative. One of the most influential of these thinkers was St. Thomas Aquinas who was a strong advocate of the theory of natural law. This provides a way to base morality on religion without raising the problems of the divine command theory.
The theory of Natural Law is not a strictly religious approach to the question of morality. It has its origins in Aristotle's theory of ethics and is the idea that everything in nature has a purpose. Because everything has a purpose this can tell us what the foundation for morality is simply because things which have a purpose ought to be used for that purpose. The justification for such normative statements is precisely the natural purpose which everything and everyone has.
The major problem with natural law theory is that it seems to violate the is-ought problem. Again this is the difficulty we have in deriving statements of what ought to be the case from statements of what is the case. The natural purpose of the eye is to see. So, does this mean that the only use the eye should be put to is to see? We could think of other examples as well including ones surrounding sexuality. Indeed, many issues here seem to turn on whether we can determine what certain body part's uses ought to be. But it seems inadequate to deduce this from the simple fact that there are certain natural uses. As Rachels points out we can say that sex is used to produce babies but logically it does not follow that sex should or should not only be used for that purpose.
The heart of natural law is the idea that we can use reason to determine what ought to be the case. This raises a problem for the original question we asked because if reason is the basis of morality then religion is not playing the fundamental role we supposed it to. Saying this does not deny that religion has a role to play in morality and moral judgments. Only that religion is not the foundation for these judgments.
The connection between religion and morality is a complex subject to say the least. We've only provided a brief look at the subject here. But many philosophers are convinced that there are enough problems involved to look elsewhere for a foundation for morality. Again, doing so does not necessarily deny that religion has important connections to morality. Many scholars speculate that religion serves to express morality and gives us a context in which to teach moral principles. A good example of this approach is advocated by Michael Shermer in his book The Science of Good and Evil. Certainly one of the functions of religion is to discourage sentiments towards selfish behavior and encourage us to be concerned with the welfare of others. However, there is an approach to ethics that questions whether this is really possible. Can we really act unselfishly? Should we? These are questions we'll address in the next two sections on egoism.
We can divide this subject into two parts and actually ask two questions. Is religion the basis or foundation for morality? Is God the basis or foundation for morality? It is really the second question which provides the basis for the strongest attempt to provide this foundation but first let's consider the possibility of religion being the foundation for morality.
I hope everyone is clear on the distinction I mean to make here between religion and God. As a way of illustrating this we can think of religion as a man made institution with many different variations, while God is independent of these religions and a transcendent being. While God may be the ultimate origin of one religion or all religions, it is very different to base morality on any one of these religions than to base it on God directly.
It is precisely the variations in religions that create the problem for basing morality on religion. Simply put, How do we know which religion is the right one to serve as the foundation? Of course everyone would say their own is the correct one but can we provide any objective evidence for this? It seems difficult to establish such objective criteria. Even if we could we still have a problem of variation because each religion has many different denominations. To illustrate this one has only to look to the United States and the classic in the field Frank S. Mead's Handbook of Denominations in the United States. This is a 350+ page book outlining all the denominations (and there are many) currently practiced. Even within major Christian denominations such as Baptist, Lutheran, and Methodist, there are many variations. If we're looking for a single foundation here we're in for some difficulties.
A third problem which we can only briefly touch on here is the problem Rachels alludes to with using Scripture as a basis for moral judgments. The difficulty here is how to be sure we're interpreting the works properly. Of course this presupposes we've addressed the question about which holy book is the correct one to use in the first place. Assuming we have, there is still the problem of interpretation since each of the Scriptures we might use could be interpreted many different ways.
This is why many philosophers look to a more abstract solution and attempt to base morality on God. There are two attempts to do this which Rachels outlines: the divine command theory and the theory of natural law. Let's consider each of these in turn.
The divine command theory postulates that morality is based directly on the commands of God himself. What God commands us to do is morally right and what God forbids us to do is morally wrong. The basis of morality then is the command itself. But, this raises an interesting question and the major problem with the divine command theory. Why is God issuing just these commands? Does God command us to do a certain action because it is moral or is it moral because God commands it? These seem to be the only two alternatives but each involves a serious problem and together a genuine dilemma for morality. Let's see why:
God commands us to do a certain action because it is moral. If this is true then God is not the ultimate origin of morality. God simply is communicating to us what is and what is not moral without being the originator. In other words, there is a reason different from God's actions themselves that makes something moral or immoral.
An action is moral because God commands it. If this option is true then morality becomes arbitrary. If the only reason that murder is immoral is because God said so, couldn't God say something different and then that would be immoral? Or couldn't God declare murder to be moral and then it would be moral?
This dilemma has led many religious thinkers to seek an alternative. One of the most influential of these thinkers was St. Thomas Aquinas who was a strong advocate of the theory of natural law. This provides a way to base morality on religion without raising the problems of the divine command theory.
The theory of Natural Law is not a strictly religious approach to the question of morality. It has its origins in Aristotle's theory of ethics and is the idea that everything in nature has a purpose. Because everything has a purpose this can tell us what the foundation for morality is simply because things which have a purpose ought to be used for that purpose. The justification for such normative statements is precisely the natural purpose which everything and everyone has.
The major problem with natural law theory is that it seems to violate the is-ought problem. Again this is the difficulty we have in deriving statements of what ought to be the case from statements of what is the case. The natural purpose of the eye is to see. So, does this mean that the only use the eye should be put to is to see? We could think of other examples as well including ones surrounding sexuality. Indeed, many issues here seem to turn on whether we can determine what certain body part's uses ought to be. But it seems inadequate to deduce this from the simple fact that there are certain natural uses. As Rachels points out we can say that sex is used to produce babies but logically it does not follow that sex should or should not only be used for that purpose.
The heart of natural law is the idea that we can use reason to determine what ought to be the case. This raises a problem for the original question we asked because if reason is the basis of morality then religion is not playing the fundamental role we supposed it to. Saying this does not deny that religion has a role to play in morality and moral judgments. Only that religion is not the foundation for these judgments.
The connection between religion and morality is a complex subject to say the least. We've only provided a brief look at the subject here. But many philosophers are convinced that there are enough problems involved to look elsewhere for a foundation for morality. Again, doing so does not necessarily deny that religion has important connections to morality. Many scholars speculate that religion serves to express morality and gives us a context in which to teach moral principles. A good example of this approach is advocated by Michael Shermer in his book The Science of Good and Evil. Certainly one of the functions of religion is to discourage sentiments towards selfish behavior and encourage us to be concerned with the welfare of others. However, there is an approach to ethics that questions whether this is really possible. Can we really act unselfishly? Should we? These are questions we'll address in the next two sections on egoism.