Subjectivism
Listen to any conversation about a moral or political issue and it won't take long for you to hear the phrase. "I feel…" People will say "I feel abortion is wrong," or "I feel that we should get out of Iraq." Is this all there is to morality and ethics; just feelings? The 18th century philosopher David Hume thought so. "Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment." The famous economist, and good friend of Hume, Adam Smith wrote an entire work titled The Theory of Moral Sentiment. Morality begins with our feelings about our fellow human beings such as sympathy, compassion, empathy. But is this all there is to morality? One theory says precisely that: subjectivism. As we'll see there are actually two different versions of this theory. The first we'll examine is called simple subjectivism. The second, slightly more refined but still somewhat flawed version, is called emotivism.
The basic idea of simple subjectivism is that all statements or morality are simply statements of approval or disapproval. So, if I say "murder is wrong" I am simply saying "I disapprove of murder." If you say "capital punishment is morally correct" you're simply saying that you approve of capital punishment. Nothing more.
In spite of its intuitive appeal, simple subjectivism has several serious problems. The first is that it cannot account for our fallibility as human beings. Let's face it, we all make mistakes. Certainly this applies to our moral judgments as well doesn't it? But, simple subjectivism seems to deny the very possibility of making a mistake. Being wrong becomes impossible because of what simple subjectivism says about our moral statements. Since all we're saying is that we approve or disapprove of something, it seems unlikely that we could be wrong about what our preferences, or as Hume puts it, our tastes regarding something. If you like coffee, for example, you're not going to mistakenly say you dislike it are you? But, in the realm of morality it seems clear that we can,
A second objection is that this theory cannot account for the disagreements we have in the area of morality. Consider the example in the book about homosexuality. One person says that homosexuality is immoral and the other says that homosexuality is moral. Clearly, they are disagreeing, right? Not according to simple subjectivism. Think again about what these moral statements really mean in simple subjectivist terms. To say "homosexuality is immoral" is simply to say "I disapprove of homosexuality. Now, if you believe homosexuality is immoral and say this to someone are they going to disagree with the claim that you disapprove of it? Of course not! And suppose they respond by saying "homosexuality is moral." Since all this means is that they approve of it, you're not going to disagree with them either are you? No. So, there is no disagreement. But wait. There really is a disagreement here isn't there? The fact that simple subjectivism cannot account for it is the problem.
Given these problems, perhaps we should look for an alternative and that's precisely what the American philosopher Charles Stevenson found in the 20thcentury. Emotivism is a more refined version of subjectivism. The main difference is what it maintains about the existence of moral facts. Simple subjectivism claimed that there were facts in moral statements. However, they were not objective facts about the world around us, but rather, facts about ourselves. The facts being what we approve and disapprove of. Emotivism disagrees with this and denies that there are such things as moral facts at all. So, moral statements are not factual statements about how we feel, they are expressions of those feelings. As Rachels puts it, we're not reporting an attitude in emotivism, we're expressing the attitude. So, when we say "murder is wrong" we're simply saying "murder, boo!" or "murder, yuck!" Or you can think of it like this. Moral statements can be interpreted as commands (which are also not factual since we cannot say that a command is true or false). So, "murder is immoral" could be interpreted as "Don't commit murder."
The advantages of emotivism over simple subjectivism are that the problems which plagued simple subjectivism are not problems for emotivism. The problem of fallibility is gone because emotivism is not saying that there's any factual content to moral statements. Since we're not stating facts, the question of being right or wrong simply doesn't apply. Also, emotivism can account for disagreement. How? Well, clearly emotivism would not say that moral arguments involve factual disagreements, but, as Stevenson points out, they do involve disagreements in our attitudes. This differs from simple subjectivism which claimed that moral statements were about our attitudes. Given this, it could not account for our disagreements. But, emotivism says that moral statements are expressions of our attitudes.
Are there any problems with emotivism? Yes, two in fact which turn out to be very serious. First, emotivism denies the use of reason in ethics. Secondly, it denies the existence of moral facts. In my estimation 3.5 and 3.6 are two of the most important sections in Rachels' book. Important because they lay the foundation for any theory of morality and remind us that moral discourse is based on something more than just opinion and emotion.
Are there moral facts? David Hume denied that there were and this denial has carried forward very well and is still a pervasive attitude not only among philosophers but the public at large. After all, there don't seem to be elements to morality that clearly stand out as the facts which tell us that something is right or wrong. Remember the "is-ought" problem? According to Rachels the mistake comes from thinking that there are only two possibilities regarding moral facts. Either they are like the facts of science or any other empirical study or there are no moral facts. But, this ignores an important third alternative. There are moral facts and these are facts of reason. The moral judgments we make are backed up by facts of reason which means that I can provide good, objective grounds for saying that a certain moral judgment is true and a certain other moral judgment is false. In other words, there can be proofs in ethics.
One of the reasons we think that there cannot be such proofs is because we look at the most difficult cases, like abortion, find them difficult and from this conclude that proving anything in ethics is impossible. This is the wrong approach. To illustrate let's consider some simpler examples considered by Rachels.
A student says that a test given by a teacher is unfair. Can the student prove this? Well, consider the evidence the student puts forward in our text. Given all of that, doesn't the student have a good, well-reasoned case for the claim that the test is unfair? Of course you might be saying that this wouldn't convince the teacher. But, remember the distinction between proving the opinion to be correct and persuading someone. The two are different and the fact that someone is not persuaded doesn't mean you haven't proven your case. What we need is a way to evaluate, objectively, whether the evidence we're putting forward is good, relevant, evidence. Certainly in the case cited, the evidence does prove the case. I mean, what else would you have the student do to prove their case?!
Notice, we can also do this for other moral claims such as:
Jones is a bad man.
Dr. Smith is irresponsible.
A certain used car dealer is unethical.
Granted these claims may be fairly easy to prove but the fact that they can be proven just shows that it is possible to offer proofs in ethics. The real question is how to do this for more difficult issues like abortion, capital punishment, and homosexuality. Clearly subjectivism cannot handle these issues. What we need is something objective, a standard independent of our opinion and emotions. For some this objective standard is divine. We'll consider next time the possibility of basing morality on religion.
The basic idea of simple subjectivism is that all statements or morality are simply statements of approval or disapproval. So, if I say "murder is wrong" I am simply saying "I disapprove of murder." If you say "capital punishment is morally correct" you're simply saying that you approve of capital punishment. Nothing more.
In spite of its intuitive appeal, simple subjectivism has several serious problems. The first is that it cannot account for our fallibility as human beings. Let's face it, we all make mistakes. Certainly this applies to our moral judgments as well doesn't it? But, simple subjectivism seems to deny the very possibility of making a mistake. Being wrong becomes impossible because of what simple subjectivism says about our moral statements. Since all we're saying is that we approve or disapprove of something, it seems unlikely that we could be wrong about what our preferences, or as Hume puts it, our tastes regarding something. If you like coffee, for example, you're not going to mistakenly say you dislike it are you? But, in the realm of morality it seems clear that we can,
A second objection is that this theory cannot account for the disagreements we have in the area of morality. Consider the example in the book about homosexuality. One person says that homosexuality is immoral and the other says that homosexuality is moral. Clearly, they are disagreeing, right? Not according to simple subjectivism. Think again about what these moral statements really mean in simple subjectivist terms. To say "homosexuality is immoral" is simply to say "I disapprove of homosexuality. Now, if you believe homosexuality is immoral and say this to someone are they going to disagree with the claim that you disapprove of it? Of course not! And suppose they respond by saying "homosexuality is moral." Since all this means is that they approve of it, you're not going to disagree with them either are you? No. So, there is no disagreement. But wait. There really is a disagreement here isn't there? The fact that simple subjectivism cannot account for it is the problem.
Given these problems, perhaps we should look for an alternative and that's precisely what the American philosopher Charles Stevenson found in the 20thcentury. Emotivism is a more refined version of subjectivism. The main difference is what it maintains about the existence of moral facts. Simple subjectivism claimed that there were facts in moral statements. However, they were not objective facts about the world around us, but rather, facts about ourselves. The facts being what we approve and disapprove of. Emotivism disagrees with this and denies that there are such things as moral facts at all. So, moral statements are not factual statements about how we feel, they are expressions of those feelings. As Rachels puts it, we're not reporting an attitude in emotivism, we're expressing the attitude. So, when we say "murder is wrong" we're simply saying "murder, boo!" or "murder, yuck!" Or you can think of it like this. Moral statements can be interpreted as commands (which are also not factual since we cannot say that a command is true or false). So, "murder is immoral" could be interpreted as "Don't commit murder."
The advantages of emotivism over simple subjectivism are that the problems which plagued simple subjectivism are not problems for emotivism. The problem of fallibility is gone because emotivism is not saying that there's any factual content to moral statements. Since we're not stating facts, the question of being right or wrong simply doesn't apply. Also, emotivism can account for disagreement. How? Well, clearly emotivism would not say that moral arguments involve factual disagreements, but, as Stevenson points out, they do involve disagreements in our attitudes. This differs from simple subjectivism which claimed that moral statements were about our attitudes. Given this, it could not account for our disagreements. But, emotivism says that moral statements are expressions of our attitudes.
Are there any problems with emotivism? Yes, two in fact which turn out to be very serious. First, emotivism denies the use of reason in ethics. Secondly, it denies the existence of moral facts. In my estimation 3.5 and 3.6 are two of the most important sections in Rachels' book. Important because they lay the foundation for any theory of morality and remind us that moral discourse is based on something more than just opinion and emotion.
Are there moral facts? David Hume denied that there were and this denial has carried forward very well and is still a pervasive attitude not only among philosophers but the public at large. After all, there don't seem to be elements to morality that clearly stand out as the facts which tell us that something is right or wrong. Remember the "is-ought" problem? According to Rachels the mistake comes from thinking that there are only two possibilities regarding moral facts. Either they are like the facts of science or any other empirical study or there are no moral facts. But, this ignores an important third alternative. There are moral facts and these are facts of reason. The moral judgments we make are backed up by facts of reason which means that I can provide good, objective grounds for saying that a certain moral judgment is true and a certain other moral judgment is false. In other words, there can be proofs in ethics.
One of the reasons we think that there cannot be such proofs is because we look at the most difficult cases, like abortion, find them difficult and from this conclude that proving anything in ethics is impossible. This is the wrong approach. To illustrate let's consider some simpler examples considered by Rachels.
A student says that a test given by a teacher is unfair. Can the student prove this? Well, consider the evidence the student puts forward in our text. Given all of that, doesn't the student have a good, well-reasoned case for the claim that the test is unfair? Of course you might be saying that this wouldn't convince the teacher. But, remember the distinction between proving the opinion to be correct and persuading someone. The two are different and the fact that someone is not persuaded doesn't mean you haven't proven your case. What we need is a way to evaluate, objectively, whether the evidence we're putting forward is good, relevant, evidence. Certainly in the case cited, the evidence does prove the case. I mean, what else would you have the student do to prove their case?!
Notice, we can also do this for other moral claims such as:
Jones is a bad man.
Dr. Smith is irresponsible.
A certain used car dealer is unethical.
Granted these claims may be fairly easy to prove but the fact that they can be proven just shows that it is possible to offer proofs in ethics. The real question is how to do this for more difficult issues like abortion, capital punishment, and homosexuality. Clearly subjectivism cannot handle these issues. What we need is something objective, a standard independent of our opinion and emotions. For some this objective standard is divine. We'll consider next time the possibility of basing morality on religion.